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Abstract
A dynamic proﬁt maximization model with adjustment costs of capital is implemented to
study US outward processing trade in apparel and to examine the eﬀects of preferential
trade policies in the long and short runs. The model is used to determine the role of
foreign investment and to simulate outcomes due to the introduction of the Trade and
Development Act of 2000 and the elimination of Multi-Fiber Agreement quotas in selected
Caribbean countries. The transitional dynamics as well as long-run costs and beneﬁts of
these trade policy changes are evaluated. While outward processing trade expands with
preferences under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, policies typically require ﬁve years to be
fully eﬀective, and competition in freer markets could reverse the beneﬁts realized under
preferential trade.
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2Introduction
Preferential trading can be an important tool used by developed country apparel importers to
expand trade with developing countries, to reduce the cost of apparel and textile production,
to initiate industrial development in some third world countries, and in some cases to protect
their own domestic industries by securing demand for domestic textiles as inputs. This has
been done under outward processing programs which have become an important part of US
(and EU) apparel trade during the last two decades. Outward processing is essentially a
preferential trade arrangement that exempts the value of materials from a preference giving
country used in foreign assembly from import duties. In some cases, the entire value of the
outward processing output is exempt as long as the main condition for outward processing
preferences - the usage of inputs from the preference giving country - is fulﬁlled.
The US established the Special Access Program (SAP) in 1986 that enabled outward
processing trade in apparel and textiles with the countries of the Caribbean. CBERA’s
(Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act which is one of the trade components of the
Caribbean Basin Initiative) apparel exports to the US grew rapidly (145%) between 1992-93
and 1998-99, from $3.4 billion to $8.4 billion (see ﬁgure 1). By 1999 outward processing
apparel trade between the Caribbean countries and the US constituted 14% of US apparel
imports, as compared to 9% in 1992. The beneﬁciary countries of SAP arrangements have
used its provisions extensively. On average for all CBERA countries the share of US outward
processing apparel in their total apparel trade with the US was 83% in 1992-93 and 85% in
1998-99 (based on data from USITC, 2000).
US outward processing ﬁrms enjoyed signiﬁcant advantages from preferences in the Ca-
ribbean. The average preference margin (the diﬀerence between most favored nation (MFN)
3duties and preferential duties) in 1992-93 was 11.7% and it was at 9.9% in 1998-99 in spite of
MFN tariﬀ reductions. Corresponding average preferential duties stood at 6.6% in 1992-93
and 5.8% in 1998-99 (USITC, 2000). As the result of these high preference margins, outward
processing ﬁrms in the US earned higher proﬁts, expanded their operations, and increased
employment of Caribbean labor and the usage of US intermediates.
Preferential trading in apparel and textiles has two sides to it. The ﬁrst is reduction of
trade barriers while maintaining rules of origin to prevent transshipments. The second is
facilitation of capital movements across countries in order to create supply capacity. Pre-
ferential trading initiatives can never be fully successful if trade barrier removals do not
encourage investments in the countries who are the beneﬁciaries of trade preferences (Pana-
gariya, 2000; McMillan et al., 1999). Developing countries may have comparative advantage
in terms of cheap and abundant labor, but they often lack adequate capital resources and
modern technologies to beneﬁt from their low labor cost.
In this article we hypothesize that foreign investment contributes signiﬁcantly to overall
capital stock for apparel production in the Caribbean and so determines US-Caribbean out-
ward processing trade. Figure shows that US exports of apparel assembly machinery to the
Caribbean followed an increasing trend along with apparel outward processing trade. This
hypothesis has far-reaching implications for trade policy eﬀects on outward processing trade
in the short versus long runs. In particular, in the short-run when capital stock is ﬁxed,
policy changes do not aﬀect trade if factor substitution is limited. In the long run when
capital stock is allowed to adjust, the sluggish investment response to trade policy changes
determines outward trade adjustments. If there are barriers to capital stock adjustment (ca-
pacity constraints and transactions costs), then the delays in capital adjustment are reﬂected
4in the evolution of apparel outward processing trade ﬂows, postponing the achievement of
trade policy targets.
The US adopted the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (TDA2000) that improved
preferential treatment of outward processing apparel from CBERA countries. The new
preferences require the usage of US made materials as was implemented under SAP, but now
completely eliminate tariﬀs (from an average of 5.8% in 1998-99 to zero).
The US apparel outward processing trade has experienced another indirect shock due
to the introduction of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) by the WTO in
1995, which was to replace the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) and to gradually eliminate
apparel and textile quotas by 2005. The ATC should result in a signiﬁcant liberalization of
apparel and textile trade between WTO member countries, including China. That is likely
to result in declining demand in the US (and the EU) for outward processing apparel from
the Caribbean. Since the estimations of the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau are
that 851 out of 932 US apparel and textile quotas will remain in place until 2005 (ITCB,
2002), the main impact of the removal of the MFA quotas on CBERA outward processing
trade is yet to come.
Given these recent trade policy changes, the goal of this paper is to examine the eﬀects of
TDA2000 and ATC on US preferential outward processing trade in apparel and textiles from
the Caribbean, emphasizing the role of foreign investment in the successful implementation
of outward processing initiatives.
Preferences and Investment Modeling
Past literature on the topics of preferential trading, multinational enterprises, and investment
dynamics is very useful for determining the right modeling approach to examine outward
5processing trade in apparel and textiles. We draw from those three bodies of literature to
develop the dynamic model used here to simulate TDA2000 and MFA quota removal impacts
on ﬁrm behavior, including investment, production and so trade.
Preferential trading is not a new topic in the trade literature. For surveys see Panagariya
(2000) and a book-length treatment by Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996). That literature as
a whole mostly analyzes preferences from a pure trade theory viewpoint, typically addressing
questions about welfare changes associated with changes in bilateral tariﬀ levels, trade ﬂows,
and the terms of trade.
Developing countries receiving preferences are assumed to have suﬃcient resources, in-
cluding capital, and an adequate level of technology to respond to preference incentives.
Thus, countries are implicitly assumed to be able to move up a long run supply curve. This
may not be the case and the preferential trade literature admits to the fact that foreign
capital might play a signiﬁcant role in the success of preferential incentives (Panagariya,
2000). However, that topic is still under early development, and literature is limited. Only
a few studies addressed outward processing trade directly (e.g. McMillan et al. (1999) and
Finger (1976)).
The literature on foreign direct investment studies the incentives to implement invest-
ments abroad and examines welfare changes resulting from operations of multinationals
(e.g. Dunning (1981); Agarwal (1980); Helpman (1985); Ethier (1986); Markusen (1995);
Brainard (1993)). The foreign direct investment literature can be used to explain foreign
investment ﬂows into apparel and textiles outward processing industries abroad in the pres-
ence of product diﬀerentiation, market power, and diﬀerences in country resource endow-
ments. The literature is largely based on the ownership-location-internalization framework
6developed by Hymer and Dunning. Outward processing operations ﬁt this framework quite
well. Location advantage is conferred by preferential tariﬀs and low foreign wages. Owner-
ship advantages reveal themselves in the form of product diﬀerentiation and market power
that imply better control over production and marketing. Internalization accounts for all
other factors that make direct investment more attractive than, for example, licensing or
sub-contracting. Costs that are associated with the implementation of foreign investment
(adjustment costs) might also depend on location and the form of ownership.
An independent body of literature explicitly models dynamics of investment spending
within a ﬁrm, although it does not speciﬁcally address foreign investments (for a recent
survey see Chirinko (1993)). Investment spending models describe the dynamics of the
investment process by explicitly incorporating adjustment costs of investment that allow
gradual adjustment of capital stock over time to a steady state. The assumption of adjust-
ment costs is natural, especially when operating in a developing country, and is reﬂected
in the diversiﬁcation of investment across CBERA countries as well as evidence of capacity
constraints and sluggishness in investment. Without adjustment costs, the capital transition
process is unclear since adjustment of the capital stock in theory (but not in practice) occurs
instantaneously.
Following that literature, an adjustment cost investment model is adapted in this pa-
per to describe the behavior of the apparel and textile outward processing ﬁrms operating
abroad. The advantage of the adjustment cost approach is that transitional dynamics of cap-
ital investment, which in turn determine apparel outward processing trade, can be studied
explicitly, and the role of investment in outward processing trade can be statistically tested.
Adjustment Cost Model of Caribbean Apparel Outward Processing Trade
7A model that closely approximates the reality of preferential trading is necessary to provide
theoretical grounds for estimation and hypothesis testing, and to forecast the eﬀects of trade
policy changes. The assumptions that we make are designed to give the model the closest
resemblance possible to the real world, given mathematical tractability and data availability.
We introduce the model as a dynamic proﬁt maximization problem of an apparel outward
processing ﬁrm operating in an imperfectly competitive environment. The model deals only
with one industry, and therefore describes partial equilibrium.
In order to focus on the production side of the problem, we assume that all outward pro-
cessing producers/ﬁrms in a single foreign country face identical constant elasticity demand
functions (p = aXθ, where demand elasticity lies in the inelastic range −1 < θ < 0), although
their products are diﬀerent, since ﬁrms are monopolists in their market for a diﬀerentiated
apparel or textile product. Since the model is dynamic and covers a long period of time it is
necessary to introduce a mechanism that allows a monopolist to exist and discourages entry
into the same market by other competing ﬁrms. To achieve that, we assume that each ﬁrm
has to make lump sum investments so that its long-run proﬁts equals zero. Partially because
we perform simulations for a limited number of outward processing countries, and also for
the sake of simplicity and computational tractability, we ignore substitution eﬀects between
countries and simulate outcomes separately for each exporting country.
The production process has three inputs – capital (K), labor (L), and intermediates
(textiles) (M), with their prices (pI, w, and pM respectively) taken as given. The produc-
tion processes exhibit constant return to scale and is of a Leontieﬀ type that mandates ﬁxed
input-output coeﬃcients and no factor substitution (Y = min{αK;βL;γM}). The Leontieﬀ
production function is an appropriate tool to model short-run rigidities in factor adjustment.
8To justify the selection of Leontieﬀ production function and the existence of capacity con-
straints in the short run, we tested it against CRTS Cobb-Douglas function that allowed
factor substitution (Y = Kα0Lβ0M1−α0−β0), and found the Leontieﬀ function to better ﬁt
observed behavior of Caribbean apparel assembly ﬁrms.
Investing in foreign countries is not a smooth process. There might be various costs
pertinent to installing capital in a foreign country associated with the foreign country’s
economic and legal conditions (legal fees, cost of licenses, overtime labor costs, etc.). These
costs can also occur due to the riskiness of outward processing operations. In this model we
account for this possibility by introducing capital adjustment costs (b I
K, where b > 0, and
I is investment), increasing with the share of investment in the ﬁrm’s overall capital stock.
This property of the model is essential to modeling sluggish response of capital stock to
changes in preferential tariﬀs. We adapted this formulation of adjustment costs from Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1999).
Using the above functional form assumptions the proﬁt maximization problem of an





























subject to the dynamic investment equation ˙ K = I −δK and initial level of capital at t0
where K(t0) = Kt0.
Since the production function uses inputs in ﬁxed proportions, we can express labor,
intermediates, and output using the capital variable, Y = αK, L = α
βK, and M = α
γK.
9Therefore, the one state variable is capital K and the control variable is investment I. The
nature of the given proﬁt maximization problem is such that in the short run production
and proﬁts are determined by the level of accumulated capital stock.
Cost of production in each period varies due to the varying adjustment costs of capital.
Apart from adjustment cost of capital, one period marginal costs are ﬁxed at
(w/β + (1 − T)pM/γ)αK.
First order conditions for the Leontieﬀ problem expressed in terms of capital stock (K)
































The solution to the ﬁrst order conditions is a maximum as long as demand is inelastic.
The ﬁrst diﬀerential equation of the system tells us the relationship between the growth
rate of capital and the shadow price of capital. The higher is the value of capital, the
more investment a ﬁrm undertakes. The second diﬀerential equation states that under
optimal behavior any change in the shadow price of capital equals the diﬀerence between
opportunity cost of capital and returns to capital. If production/capital expansion results
in high return to capital, reﬂecting proﬁtability of operations, the value of additional capital
would decline faster, resulting in more rapid changes in q and more investment. The ﬁnal
equation represents transversality condition that states that in the limit (as t goes to inﬁnity)
the present value of capital stock is zero.
10The above system of diﬀerential equations (ﬁrst order conditions) is essential to the
analysis of eﬀects of TDA2000 and ATC on Caribbean apparel outward processing trade.
With its help we are able to solve numerically for the transitional dynamics of the model –
paths of growth rates of capital, output, and inputs, and their response to changes in tariﬀs
(TDA2000) and import demands (ATC). The intuition of the model is straightforward.
Increased preference margins generate additional proﬁts to apparel ﬁrms in the short run,
but production and trade do not expand immediately due to capacity constraints (and very
limited opportunities for factor substitution). Those proﬁts are reﬂected in the shadow price
of capital such that returns to apparel production exceed normal returns, and so encourage
investment. But adjustment costs insure that investment only occurs gradually. The high
initial proﬁts permit paying greater adjustment costs and so result in more rapid investment.
As steady state is approached, adjustment costs are lower due to lower investment rates,
which just keep up with depreciation of the capital stock. When both preference margins
improve and competition from elsewhere increases (due to eliminated MFA quotas) the
incentives to invest are less, and can even turn negative and encourage disinvestment (or
idle capacity), depending on the extent of the demand shock versus the proﬁtability from
the greater preference margin.
Data, Parameter Estimation, and Short-Run Capacity Constraint Testing
Data used to test for short-run capacity constraints on US outward processing trade and to es-
timate parameters for the simulation model was obtained from the USITC trade database for
7 countries - Guatemala, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua,
and Trinidad & Tobago. Data was collected on annual basis and ranged from 1992 through
1999. Accumulated capital stock was approximated by apparel and textile machinery ex-
11ports from the US to the Caribbean countries using USITC data starting from 1989. We also
used the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimate for apparel machinery depreciation (δ = 1/19
years). Real interest rates came from World Development Indicators 2001 (World Bank).
Wage data originated from the LABORSTA database maintained by International Labor
Organization, with some data points interpolated where observations were missing.
All econometric estimations were performed on a data sample from 7 Caribbean countries.
In general, econometric estimations supported the choice of a Leontieﬀ production function,
revealed short run-capacity constraints, and demonstrated the strong relationship between
accumulated apparel machinery imports (capital stock) and trade ﬂows (details are available
from the authors). Simulations were limited to 4 major outward processing suppliers -
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica, who accounted for 65% of
CBERA apparel trade with the US in 1998-99.
To implement simulations of the outcomes of TDA2000 and ATC on Caribbean outward
processing trade, we needed to have the estimates of demand parameters (a and θ), the
adjustment cost parameter (b), and Leontieﬀ production coeﬃcients (α, β, and γ). Their
estimates are presented in table 1 along with other parameters and starting variable values
used in simulations. We obtained demand parameters from a ﬁxed-eﬀect regression of a
constant elasticity demand function (as was speciﬁed in the model). The elasticity of de-
mand (θ) was assumed to be the same across Caribbean countries and demand shifters (a)
were assumed to vary across countries. The estimate of adjustment cost coeﬃcient (b) was
obtained from estimations of a discrete version of the Euler equation derived from the ﬁrst
order conditions (equation 2 and 3) under rational expectation assumptions. The estimation
method was GMM. The adjustment costs proved to be an important part of capital costs
12and accounted for 8.2% to 17.1% of total investment expenditures in 1999. Finally, we used
the GTAP 1997 database and USITC trade data to benchmark input-output production
coeﬃcients for apparel and textile industries in the Caribbean Basin.
Simulations of Trade Policy Changes in Caribbean Outward Processing Trade
Simulations consisted of four scenarios for each country that featured various trade policy
alternatives. In the ﬁrst scenario (P0) no policy change was implemented. The outcomes
of that scenario served as benchmarks for comparison. In the second scenario (PT), we
decreased outward processing tariﬀs to zero, simulating the impact of the TDA2000. The
last two scenarios (PT10 and PT30) modeled the eﬀects of simultaneous implementation of
TDA2000 and MFA quota elimination.
MFA quota removal has a signiﬁcant potential to adversely inﬂuence US outward pro-
cessing trade with the Caribbean region. Apparel and textile imports from Asia, when no
longer restricted by quotas, may put signiﬁcant pressure on US demand for outward pro-
cessing imports from the Caribbean region because US consumers would partially substitute
Asian apparel and textile products for Caribbean goods. Several studies have addressed the
issue of MFA quota removal in the past. For example, Trela and Whalley (1990) provided
general equilibrium estimates of the eﬀects of MFA quota removal on trade ﬂows for three
Caribbean countries. According to their estimates, the changes in the value of imports of
apparel and textiles from those countries as the result of MFA quota elimination were -14%
for Costa Rica, -21% for Dominican Republic, and 7% for Guatemala. Yang et al. (1997)
used a computable general equilibrium model based on the GTAP database to simulate the
outcomes of the abolishment of MFA quotas. According to their results, Latin American
countries would decrease exports of clothing by 23%. Admitting to the fact that supply
13eﬀects are likely to be present in general equilibrium estimates, we decided to use 10% and
30% for negative shocks in US demand for outward processing apparel from the Caribbean
in order to obtain reasonable demand decreases, and at the same time see how sensitive
the simulation results are to the diﬀerent magnitudes of demand responses to MFA quota
removal. To implement the demand shock we decreased the demand equation constant (a)
by 10% for all countries under PT10 and by 30% under PT30.
Simulations that represented solutions for the system of diﬀerential equation (equations
2, 3, and 4) were run for each country separately and the results are summarized in table 2
and ﬁgure . We used MATLAB 6.1 to conduct the simulations.
Figure presents transitional dynamics for capital accumulation/apparel outward pro-
cessing trade from the Dominican Republic to the US. Behavior depicted there is typical of
results found for the four Caribbean exporters simulated in this paper. In 1999, capacity
constraints are binding, the shadow price of capital exceeds its equilibrium value, and so
capital stock and investment are not yet at steady state levels. Transition to steady state
capital stock (and so trade) as represented by curve P0 takes about 5 years, asymptotically
approaching long run base scenario capital by 2003. When tariﬀs are removed, capital accu-
mulates more quickly and higher trade ﬂows are realized, according to curve PT. In this case
both demand shocks (PT10 and PT30) overwhelm the eﬀects of increased proﬁt incentives, so
corresponding curves show disinvestment and a lower long run capital stock, with the 30%
shock bringing very signiﬁcant declines in capital and so production and trade. The larger
shocks require a bit longer to converge to steady state, but near convergence within ﬁve
years is typical.
Simulation of Eﬀects of Trade and Development Act of 2000
14Simulation of the impact of TDA2000 introduces signiﬁcant changes to model predictions
(see PT in table 2). Elimination of tariﬀs on outward processing apparel imports from the
Caribbean region increased the returns to capital, resulting in higher shadow prices of capital.
In 2000, the shadow price of capital for Dominican Republic increases 7% to $1,629 from
benchmark policy’s $1,523 when tariﬀs are set to zero. (Results for the Dominican republic
will be used to illustrate the consequences of trade policy changes, with simulation results
for all four countries included in tables 2, 3 and 4.)
Tariﬀ reductions revitalize outward processing trade. Even though its eﬀects would not
show immediately, outward processing expansion would be clearly seen within several years.
It takes on average 5 years to get close the long run equilibrium. In the ﬁrst year of the
forecast (2000) outward processing trade would go up as compared to the benchmark forecast
by 10% in Dominican Republic. In 2006, the diﬀerence would be 15% (see table 3).
Tariﬀ removal aﬀects outward processing ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and production cost, which
in turn inﬂuences investment and outward processing trade patterns. This scenario is bound
to increase the total cost of apparel outward processing since the simulations showed that
overall outward processing trade levels were to increase. Cost decomposition under diﬀerent
scenarios for each country is shown in table 2. Intermediates constituted the largest part
of expenditures. For example, in 2000, expenditures on intermediates in the Dominican
Republic increased from benchmark $893 million to $986 million in PT. In 2006 corresponding
expenditures would be $916 million versus $1056 million. Labor costs increased as well in
2000 from benchmark $269 to $297 million. In 2006 the diﬀerence would be even larger –
$276 million versus $318 million.
Tariﬀ reductions made investment expenditure in Dominican Republic double in 2000.
15The new investment level stood at $46 million, versus $22 million. Such a large investment
expansion resulted in a signiﬁcant increase in adjustment costs. The benchmark adjustment
cost in 2000 in Dominican Republic was $1.6 million, as compared to $7.4 million if the tariﬀ
reduction were implemented. By 2006 investment and adjustment costs would be much
smaller because the model would be close to its steady state equilibrium. Production costs
of outward processing ﬁrms in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala responded to a tariﬀ
shock in a similar way.
When tariﬀs on outward processing were eliminated, the simulation showed that outward
processing ﬁrms signiﬁcantly increased their proﬁts (returns to capital). In 2000 proﬁt
margins of outward processing ﬁrms in Dominican Republic increased from 33.3% in the
no-shock benchmark to 40.4%. Over time the PT scenario resulted in increasing proﬁts.
However, the proﬁt margins in percentage terms were stable, not changing very much. In
2000 tariﬀ removal increased proﬁts of outward processing ﬁrms in Dominican Republic from
benchmark $703 million to $906 million. As the model converged to a new equilibrium with
zero tariﬀs, accumulating capital, proﬁts gradually approached their new, higher values.
Simulations showed that in 2006 aggregate proﬁt of outward processing ﬁrms in Dominican
Republic became $949 million.
Long-run expansion of outward processing trade in the Caribbean region as a result of
tariﬀ removal led to lower prices of imported apparel. In 2000 prices of outward processing
apparel from Dominican Republic dropped from $70.9 to $68.2.
The US government is estimated to lose $223 million in 2000 in net tariﬀ revenue on
outward processing apparel imports from Dominican Republic. In the situation where pro-
duction capacities are close to steady state (in 2006), tariﬀ revenue loss would be $225
16million.
Simulation of ATC Eﬀects
In this section we assess the impacts of MFA quota removal on apparel and textile outward
processing trade from the Caribbean region (see table 2). Diﬀerences between the eﬀects
of policies PT10 and PT30 on capital and trade growth rate were signiﬁcant. A 10% shock
shifted growth rates down, leaving them positive in El Salvador and Guatemala, and pushing
capital growth rates in Dominican Republic and Costa Rica negative. In 2000 PT10 growth
rates were -0.6% in Costa Rica as compared to benchmark level of 4.7%, 1.2% in Guatemala
as compared to 3%, -2% in Dominican Republic as compared to 2.5%, and 2.2% in El
Salvador as compared to 4.5%. The PT10 scenario resulted in positive capital accumulation
in El Salvador and Guatemala and negative capital accumulation in Dominican Republic
and Costa Rica.
Policy scenario PT30 completely reversed the dynamics of the model, due to disinvestment.
Under scenario PT30 growth dropped initially (year 2000) to -26.6% in Dominican Republic
PT30 capital accumulation paths were all below benchmark policy paths (P0 ), indicating
disinvestment (most of the adjustment occurred within 5 years). Thus, according to the
results of simulations, adverse demand shocks that are likely to occur have more inﬂuence
on investment and outward processing trade than changes in tariﬀ policy as implemented in
TDA2000, taking into consideration that demand shocks were implemented simultaneously
with the tariﬀ decrease.
Long-run apparel outward processing trade decreased signiﬁcantly as the results of MFA
quota removal (see table 3). PT10 scenario reduced the trade by 5% to 14% depending on
the country. A negative 30% demand shock cut it approximately in half.
17Over time under both scenarios, investment, whether positive or negative, converged to
the equilibrium level of capital depreciation as capital stocks were reaching their new steady
states. Initial introduction of policy PT10 pushed down investment in 2000 to $4.8 million in
Guatemala, $2.8 million in Costa Rica, $3.7 million in Dominican Republic, and $6.5 million
in El Salvador. Policy PT30 resulted in disinvestment and in 2000 outward processing ﬁrms
in Guatemala disinvested $15 million, in Costa Rica - $17 million, in Dominican Republic -
$67 million, and in El Salvador - $18 million.
Adjustment costs under a 10% demand shock scenario in El Salvador and Guatemala
behaved in the same way as in the previous cases. They decreased as the amount of new
investment decreased. However, under a 30% demand shock scenario adjustment costs were
high and decreasing in the beginning when ﬁrms were actively disinvesting, getting close
to zero around 2002 when investments were close to zero, and then started to increase
again when capital disaccumulation slowed down and investment became positive to counter
capital depreciation. Under scenario PT10 adjustment costs in 2000 decreased to $0.4 million
in Guatemala, $0.16 million in Costa Rica, $0.047 million in Dominican Republic, and $0.61
million in El Salvador. Under PT30 scenario in 2000 the adjustment costs were estimated to
be respectively $4 million, $6 million, $15.6 million, and $4.6 million.
As the result of demand shocks proﬁtability of outward processing operations declined as
compared to no-tariﬀ scenario PT . Under scenario PT10 in 2000 outward processing proﬁts
in Dominican Republic dropped to $734 million, which was still larger than the benchmark
proﬁt of $703 million. When a 30% demand shock was introduced, the decrease in proﬁt
was signiﬁcant for outward processing ﬁrms in all countries. In 2000 in Dominican Republic
proﬁts fell to $438 million. The PT30 proﬁts remained much lower than the benchmark proﬁts
18in the next periods. Such signiﬁcant decreases in proﬁts completely eliminated proﬁt gains
that resulted from tariﬀ removal.
Long-Run Cost Beneﬁt Analysis
Long-run costs and beneﬁts of the eﬀects of trade policies/scenarios related to outward
processing were calculated as discounted streams of payments to the agents participating in
Caribbean outward processing - ﬁrms’ proﬁts, payments to Caribbean labor, payments to
US producers of intermediate textiles, and US government’s net tariﬀ revenue. Discounted
streams were annualized in order to show costs and beneﬁts in per-period terms. Annualized
terms represent uniform one-period gains/losses which, if summed and discounted over an
inﬁnite period of time, would equal long-run discounted gains/losses. The main results of
the cost-beneﬁt analysis for the Caribbean outward processing countries are presented in
table 4, and discussion again focuses on results from that table for the Dominican Republic.
The values in the tables represent diﬀerences between the outcomes of scenarios in which
tariﬀ and demand shocks were implemented and the outcomes of the benchmark scenarios.
The scenario simulating the outcomes of TDA2000 showed that the zero tariﬀ policy
beneﬁted all agents except for the US government. According to PT long-run compensation
of labor increased by $37 million in Dominican Republic. Because of its higher value share,
intermediates gained more than labor. The increase in purchases of intermediates by out-
ward processing ﬁrms from Dominican Republic exceeded $122 million. The loss in net US
government tariﬀ revenue was signiﬁcant. Due to tariﬀ removal the model estimated that the
present value of long-run revenue loss from the Dominican Republic would be $373 million.
Lost US government tariﬀ revenues partially contributed to ﬁrms’ proﬁt gains (capital
return gains). In particular, outward processing ﬁrms in Dominican Republic are expected
19to gain $219 million in long-run proﬁts. The rest of lost US tariﬀ revenues went to US
consumers, since tariﬀ removal decreased prices of outward processing imports. (Consumer
welfare calculation is complicated by the gains due to lower Asian (substitute) apparel prices,
and so is not implemented.)
The scenario that decreased demand for Caribbean outward processing imports by 10%
decreased the beneﬁts going to the factors of production. However, long-run proﬁts/returns
to capital still were above the benchmark levels (except for Costa Rica) mainly because no
tariﬀs were imposed in that simulation.
After a negative 10% shock to outward processing import demand for apparel, foreign
apparel and textile workers would lose in the long-run $28 million in Dominican Republic
as a result of a 10% decrease in outward processing import demand. The losses of US
intermediate textile producers who supply outward processing ﬁrms were higher. Long-run
purchases of intermediate textiles would go down by $94 million in the Dominican Republic.
Firms’ long-run proﬁts would still be higher in most cases than what they would earn
if there were not a tariﬀ and demand shock, except for Costa Rica. Long-run proﬁts of
ﬁrms from Dominican Republic would increase by $13 million. Firms in Costa Rica would
experience a long-run proﬁt loss of $7 million. In the Costa Rican apparel outward processing
industry elimination of tariﬀs would not provide enough leverage to increase proﬁts in the
event of a 10% decrease in demand.
The last scenario that featured a 30% import demand decrease reversed the beneﬁts for
all the agents (in the Caribbean and the US), including outward processing ﬁrms’ long-
run proﬁts, and diverted the long-run outward processing trade. Long-run compensation
of apparel workers in the Caribbean region dropped signiﬁcantly. In Dominican Republic
20long-run wage expenses decreased by $130 million. The beneﬁts to US intermediate textile
producers went down signiﬁcantly, as well. The largest loss would be in intermediate textile
sales to the outward processing industry in Dominican Republic, constituting $431 million.
Long-run proﬁts decreased signiﬁcantly from their benchmark level. Loss in long-run
proﬁts as a result of a 30% demand shock was $311 million for outward processing operations
in Dominican Republic.
Conclusions
Overall, the approach taken here to study apparel outward processing trade in the Caribbean
is quite restrictive since simplifying assumptions about demand, adjustment cost structure,
and the production process were necessary in order to make the model solvable. Data used
in this study also was subject to weaknesses. However, the study still provides important
insights on the phenomenon of apparel outward processing trade in the Caribbean and helps
understand its dynamics despite modeling limitations.
The study shows the importance of capital accumulation by way of foreign investment,
and adjustment costs of capital in apparel outward processing trade in the Caribbean region.
It also highlights capacity constraints and rigidities in factor allocation as determinants of
trade ﬂow adjustments.
Simulations of the eﬀects of the Trade and Development Act showed that outward pro-
cessing ﬁrms, assembling apparel in the Caribbean region, respond to tariﬀ elimination by
speeding up their investment, expanding trade, and lowering import prices. Adjustment to
the tariﬀ change would take time instead of occurring instantaneously. In the ﬁrst year of
policy implementation trade would change somewhat as compared to the no-shock scenario.
However, most of the adjustment of capital and trade would occur over 5 years, ultimately
21increasing trade by 13% to 24% in volume depending on country.
The simulations of MFA quota inﬂuence on the Caribbean outward processing apparel
trade showed that even if elimination of MFA quotas results in relatively little substitution
away from the Caribbean apparel toward Asian apparel, the positive eﬀects of complete
tariﬀ elimination on apparel trade and investment in the Caribbean could be compromised,
and investment and trade would slow down. In cases when MFA substitution aﬀects import
demands signiﬁcantly, trade and investment expansion can be reversed, resulting in shrinking
outward processing trade and disinvestment or idle capacity along with falling proﬁtability
and depressed import prices.
The results of the long-run cost-beneﬁt analysis show that within a dynamic partial
equilibrium setting even small demand shocks as a result of MFA removal can signiﬁcantly
harm US production factor suppliers in the outward processing business in the Caribbean
region. Negative demand shocks of a higher magnitude (30% in our case) can result in
considerable long-run trade diversion in the Caribbean region. If the magnitude of the
demand shock increases, the long-run proﬁtability (returns to capital) of outward processing
ﬁrms would be compromised, as well, despite the fact that the former does not have to pay
tariﬀs any longer and output prices decrease. Among suppliers of factors of production, US
producers of intermediates and then foreign (Caribbean) outward processing workers would
lose noticeably in terms of long-run revenues. US government loses automatically, since
according to TDA2000, tariﬀ revenues are no longer collected on outward processing apparel
and textile imports. The US government loss is, however, mostly a transfer of beneﬁts
because lost tariﬀ revenues would be re-distributed between outward processing ﬁrms and
US consumers.
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Figure 1: CBERA apparel exports to the US and US apparel machinery imports










































Figure 2: Capital accumulation under alternative scenarios in Dominican Repu-
plic
25Table 1: Data from 1999 Used in Simulations of US Outward Processing Trade
in Apparel




capital) K99 77,567 59,545 89,797 165,556
Price of Capital pI $879.84 $1,114.39 $751.01 $1,359.58
Wage, hourly w $1.24 $1.31 $1.62 $1.72
Price of
Intermediates pM $27.00 $18.38 $14.60 $15.73
MFN Tariﬀ T 19.1% 17.8% 15.6% 18.3%
Demand Multiplier a 40646 29329 37123 60690
Capital Production
Coeﬃcient α 94.30 479.56 145.56 172.22
Labor Production
Coeﬃcient β 0.08 0.19 0.21 0.19
Intermediates
Production Coeﬃcient γ 0.97 1.62 0.6 0.53
Adjustment Cost
Coeﬃcient b $2,079.18 $2,079.18 $2,079.18 $2,079.18
Elasticity of Demand θ -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39
Initial Capital
Growth Rate γ99 6.76% 15.18% 11.38% 7.24%
Depreciation Rate δ 5% 5% 5% 5%
Discount Factor ¯ r 10% 10% 10% 10%
26Table 2: Summary of Simulation Results
Sce- Dominican El Salvador Guatemala Costa Rica
nario Republic
2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006
Trade/Turnover P0 2,113.7 2,146.5 1,049.1 1,073.7 619.9 634.4 819.9 847.7
(millions of PT 2,244.5 2,340.5 1,152.1 1,217.2 670.8 723.5 859.2 911.9
US$) PT10 1,809.9 1,789.5 920.4 930.6 548.6 553.4 700.4 697.4
PT30 1,103.7 943.3 547.9 490.5 346.5 292.0 438.8 367.8
Proﬁt P0 703.6 715.5 347.6 355.0 206.0 210.1 282.9 290.0
(millions of PT 906.6 949.8 462.6 488.2 275.2 294.8 351.7 368.2
1999 US$) PT10 734.7 726.2 369.7 373.3 223.9 225.4 282.4 281.6
PT30 438.0 382.8 211.4 196.7 131.0 118.9 159.2 148.5
Labor P0 269.3 276.2 213.4 221.7 115.5 120.0 108.9 115.0
Costs PT 297.3 318.5 249.0 272.6 131.5 149.0 117.6 129.7
(millions of PT10 248.1 243.5 204.7 208.4 112.4 114.0 99.9 99.2
1999 US$) PT30 166.2 128.4 131.8 109.8 79.8 60.2 70.0 52.3
Intermediate P0 893.7 916.6 353.4 367.1 212.9 221.1 343.4 362.7
Costs PT 986.5 1,056.9 412.3 451.3 242.4 274.5 370.9 409.1
(millions of PT10 823.4 808.1 338.8 345.0 207.0 210.0 315.1 312.9
1999 US$) PT30 551.7 426.0 218.2 181.9 147.0 110.9 220.7 165.1
Investment P0 22.26 12.74 9.57 3.97 6.85 3.94 8.84 4.08
Costs PT 46.70 14.71 21.64 4.88 16.77 4.94 14.67 4.61
(millions of PT10 3.73 11.20 6.59 3.72 4.90 3.72 2.86 3.49
1999 US$) PT30 -67.86 5.83 -18.14 1.95 -15.28 1.87 -17.14 1.77
Adjustment P0 1.68 0.51 1.29 0.19 0.81 0.25 1.60 0.30
Costs PT 7.41 0.59 6.58 0.24 4.87 0.31 4.42 0.34
(millions of PT10 0.05 0.45 0.61 0.18 0.42 0.23 0.17 0.25
1999 US$) PT30 15.65 0.23 4.63 0.10 4.04 0.11 6.03 0.12
Tariﬀ
Revenuea All 223.1 224.9 123.8 125.7 77.8 79.0 74.3 75.6
continued on next page
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7Table 2: continued
Sce- Dominican El Salvador Guatemala Costa Rica
nario Republic
2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006
Price of P0 70.9 70.2 33.7 33.2 80.9 79.7 58.2 56.9
Apparel PT 68.2 66.3 31.7 30.6 76.9 73.2 56.4 54.3
Output, PT10 65.9 66.3 30.8 30.6 73.6 73.2 54.1 54.3
(US$) PT30 59.9 66.3 28.5 30.6 65.5 73.1 48.4 54.3
Physical P0 173 178 65 68 81 84 97 102
Capital, K(t) PT 191 205 76 83 93 105 105 115
(thousand PT10 160 157 62 63 79 80 89 88
units) PT30 107 83 40 33 56 42 62 47
Capital P0 2.59% 0.01% 4.52% 0.00% 3.04% 0.03% 4.72% 0.03%
Growth PT 7.67% 0.01% 11.51% 0.01% 10.82% 0.07% 9.08% 0.04%
Rate, γK(t) PT10 -2.04% 0.00% 2.27% 0.00% 1.21% 0.01% -0.64% 0.00%
PT30 -26.68% -0.04% -21.77% -0.01% -22.29% -0.17% -24.59% -0.13%
Shadow Price P0 1,523 1,469 1,318 1,224 1,053 990 959 861
of Capital, q(t) PT 1,629 1,469 1,463 1,224 1,214 991 1,049 861
(US$) PT10 1,427 1,469 1,271 1,224 1,014 989 847 860
PT30 914 1,468 771 1,224 526 986 349 858
aMillions of 1999 US$
2
8Table 3: Long-Run Changes in US Apparel Outward Processing Trade as Com-




Dominican Republic 15% -12% -54%
El Salvador 23% -6% -50%
Guatemala 24% -5% -50%
Costa Rica 13% -14% -54%
∗Outward processing apparel trade ﬂows in 2006 under trade policies PT, PT10, and PT30
are compared to 2006 P0 benchmark outward processing apparel trade ﬂows.
Table 4: Annualized Discounted Gains and Losses under Diﬀerent Policy Sce-
narios with Outward Processing∗
Agent Policy Guatemala El Salvador Costa Dominican
Rica Republic
CBI Labor PT 24.6 44.7 12.6 36.9
PT10 -5.1 -11.6 -13.5 -28.4
PT30 -51.3 -99 -54 -129.8
US Intermediate PT 45.3 74.1 39.8 122.4
Textiles PT10 -9.4 -19.3 -42.5 -94.3
PT30 -94.5 -163.9 -170.4 -430.8
Firms’ Proﬁt PT 78.3 124.6 73.2 219.1
PT10 15.1 18.1 -6.7 13.3
PT30 -84.9 -148.9 -133.1 -310.5
US Government All -114.8 -181.3 -124.9 -372.8
∗Millions of 1999 US$
29